A self-defense shooting case is what is called an “affirmative defense.” It’s no longer a matter of “whodunit”; your defense attorney has already stipulated that you were the one who fired the fatal shot(s). It has now come down to “why did the defendant shoot him,” and therein lies the heart of “the ultimate issue,” guilt or innocence.’
Understanding the Realities of Affirmative Defense
From police to military to armed citizen classes, students are taught that when the only alternative is shoot or die, they should aim for the center of mass. This is generally interpreted as the center of the upper chest.
Practically speaking, given the degradation of marksmanship, which occurs under life-threatening stress, it is the most forgiving point-of-aim when the purpose is to render the opponent incapable of pulling a trigger.
But now we are driving a bullet toward the heart, the great vessels of the circulatory system, and perhaps the spinal cord, and death is a predictable result. This leads to a great deal of confusion.
A famous criminology instructor has said as much.
A reporter who interviewed him once wrote, “Asked whether police officer training historically teaches a ‘shoot to kill’ philosophy, veteran officers overwhelmingly answered ‘yes,’ but said death isn’t necessarily the end goal. ‘Killing isn’t the objective,’ said Geoffrey Alpert, a professor at the University of South Carolina who researches high-risk police activity. ‘The objective is to remove the threat.’”
Remember that the next time some chest-pounder on the Internet says, “Only wimps and apologists say ‘shoot to stop.’ We’re aiming toward their heart, ain’t we? We real men shoot to kill!”
That sort of misplaced machismo can send you to prison.
Shoot to Wound?
We live today under a President who famously asked in 2020, “…when there’s an unarmed person coming at them with a knife or something, you shoot them in the leg instead of in the heart …”
Let that sink in. Quite apart from the non sequitur of an unarmed man with a knife. The suggestion to “shoot to wound” in such a situation does not take reality into account.
A knife-wielding man can continue his charge with a leg shot unless the bullet disintegrates the kneecap or femur. And a bullet-severed femoral artery is likely to cause death by exsanguinations quite swiftly.
What about the old “shoot the gun out of his hand” advice? Consider three case studies of that from just one gunfight.
Case One – FBI Firefight
The historic FBI firefight in Miami on April 11, 1986. At the opening of the fight, Supervisory Special Agent Gordon McNeill fired four shots from his S&W Model 19 revolver. He wounded one of the two perpetrators before he was hit in the gun hand with a .223 rifle bullet.
He was able to fire two more shots with the wounded hand before he ran dry. The second gunshot wound crippled him for life.
Case Two – Not Out of the Fight
Same incident. The cop-killer who shot McNeill was hit through the gun arm into the chest. The shot severed a major artery with an unsurvivable wound. Yet, he still managed to kill both the man who shot him and another agent. He also wounded McNeill and several other agents before he was finally killed.
Case Three – Wounded and Still Fighting
Still the same incident. Special Agent Edmundo Mireles’ left arm was rendered hors de combat early in the fight by the same cop-killer. Yet, at the end of the gun battle, he was able to fire his Remington 870 pump shotgun one-handed for five rounds.
He then drew his S&W 686 and moved in on the murderer and his accomplice. He killed both with five solid hits fired one-hand only. So much for “shoot the gun arm.”
The same dynamics are at work for both good guys and bad guys.
Death In Court
Lawman or law-abiding armed citizen, we are only allowed to use lethal force to prevent death or grave bodily harm to innocent parties, including ourselves. Hence, “Shoot to Stop,” not “Shoot to Kill.”
A prosecutor must establish mens rea, “the guilty mind,” in such a case. That can come down to purpose!
“Shoot to kill” smacks of malice. “Shoot to stop” explains a lawful benevolent purpose:
“I shot him to keep him from murdering me or another innocent person,” for example.
Case Four – Dallas Police Officer Amber Guyger
The murder conviction of Dallas Police Officer Amber Guyger in the tragic death of Botham Jean. Coming home to her apartment building after an exhausting day at work, where each floor and door looked the same, she got off the elevator on the wrong floor and put her key in the wrong door, thinking it was hers.
The door was ajar and swung open by itself. She saw a large man coming toward her, yelling, “Hey! Hey! Hey!” and drew her weapon, firing the fatal shot. It had been Mr. Jean’s own apartment.
I had no involvement in the case but watched it livestream out of professional interest. When she was asked if she “shot to kill,” and she answered in the affirmative, I cringed. The Texas murder statute specifically says “intentional killing.”
The jury apparently took that to heart in their guilty verdict. The defense made other mistakes in that trial too. But in my opinion, confirming that she “shot to kill” helped turn what legal terminology calls an “excusable homicide” – a tragic mistake any reasonable and prudent person might have made under the circumstances, for which they should be held harmless – into a guilty verdict that destroyed her life as surely as the same mistake had ended Mr. Jean’s.
Understanding Affirmative Defense and Self-Defense Law
It goes to purpose. Anyone who tells you “shoot to kill” is what “real men” do is telling you that they don’t have a clue about how self-defense law works.
Our purpose in firing the defense gun is not to kill. The lawful purpose of such an act is to keep the person in front of the gun from killing or crippling us or another innocent person we have a right to protect.
This article was originally published in the Personal Defense World February/March 2022 issue. Subscription is available in print and digital editions at OutdoorGroupStore.com. Or call 1-800-284-5668, or email subscriptions@athlonmediagroup.com.
